Information leakage forces cooperation

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(89)90007-9zbMath0755.90101OpenAlexW1980260655MaRDI QIDQ1191825

Akihiko Matsui

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/786.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumprobability of espionagetwo-person repeated game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Games with espionage ⋮ On `informationally robust equilibria' for bimatrix games ⋮ Feigning ignorance for long-term gains ⋮ Entry and espionage with noisy signals ⋮ Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society ⋮ Induction and the Ramsey policy ⋮ Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing ⋮ Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views ⋮ Contractual delay and efficiency in delegation games. Two-principal case ⋮ Cooperation and bounded recall

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