Contractual delay and efficiency in delegation games. Two-principal case

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(90)90140-VzbMATH Open0722.90086WikidataQ128011899 ScholiaQ128011899MaRDI QIDQ757261FDOQ757261

Authors: Shinsuke Kambe, Hitoshi Matsushima 

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Delay in a bargaining game with contracts
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• Delegation principle for multi-agency games under ex post equilibrium
• Delay in bargaining games with complete information
• Delegation equilibrium payoffs in integer-splitting games
• Regular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games
• Stackelberg equilibria in managerial delegation games
• Strategic delegation in a Stackelberg game with multiple stages
• Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
• Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information

zbMATH Keywords

two-principal delegation game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Cites Work

• Information leakage forces cooperation

Cited In (2)

• Delegation principle for multi-agency games under ex post equilibrium
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation

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