Stackelberg equilibria in managerial delegation games

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2011.02.021zbMath1237.91150MaRDI QIDQ421516

Fabian Berr

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.02.021

zbMATH Keywords

game theory; economics; continuous optimization; strategic delegation; managerial incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A65: Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games)

90B50: Management decision making, including multiple objectives

Related Items

Unnamed Item, Beyond myopic best response (in Cournot competition), On noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in the multiple leader-follower game, Vertical product differentiation, managerial delegation and social welfare in a vertically-related market, Stackelberg leadership and managerial delegation under hyperbolic demand

Cites Work

• Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly
• Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly
• On the uniqueness of Nash equilibria
• Incentives and individual motivation in supervised work groups
• Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted
• The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields
• Relative performance evaluation and contract externalities
• Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games