Stackelberg equilibria in managerial delegation games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:421516
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2011.02.021zbMath1237.91150MaRDI QIDQ421516
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.02.021
91A65: Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games)
90B50: Management decision making, including multiple objectives
Related Items
Unnamed Item, Beyond myopic best response (in Cournot competition), On noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in the multiple leader-follower game, Vertical product differentiation, managerial delegation and social welfare in a vertically-related market, Stackelberg leadership and managerial delegation under hyperbolic demand
Cites Work
- Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly
- Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly
- On the uniqueness of Nash equilibria
- Incentives and individual motivation in supervised work groups
- Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted
- The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields
- Relative performance evaluation and contract externalities
- Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games