Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly
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Publication:876888
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2006.03.006zbMATH Open1168.91364OpenAlexW1990863003MaRDI QIDQ876888FDOQ876888
Authors: Sudesh Mujumdar, Debashis Pal
Publication date: 19 April 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.006
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Cites Work
Cited In (10)
- Managerial delegation contracts, ``green R\&D and emissions taxation
- Competition and the strategic choice of managerial incentives: the relative performance case
- Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result
- Stackelberg equilibria in managerial delegation games
- Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
- Managerial Incentives and Polluting Inputs Under Imperfect Competition
- Extended games played by managerial firms with asymmetric costs
- Observable managerial incentives and spatial competition
- Management turnover, strategic ambiguity and supply incentives
- Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition
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