Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2006.03.006MaRDI QIDQ876888zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sudesh Mujumdar, Debashis Pal

Publication date 19 April 2007

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.006

zbMATH Keywords

CournotStackelbergmanagerial incentivesleaderfollower

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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Cites work

• Cournot duopoly with two production periods
• Cournot duopoly with two production periods and cost differentials
• On the endogeneity of Cournot--Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation
• Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly
• Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication

Cited in

(13)

• Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result
• Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition
• Stackelberg equilibria in managerial delegation games
• Managerial Incentives and Polluting Inputs Under Imperfect Competition
• Upstream collusion and downstream managerial incentives
• Managerial incentives and endogenous coalition formation with externalities
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Observable managerial incentives and spatial competition
• Managerial delegation contracts, ``green R\&D and emissions taxation
• When an inefficient competitor makes higher profit than its efficient rival
• Management turnover, strategic ambiguity and supply incentives
• Competition and the strategic choice of managerial incentives: the relative performance case
• Extended games played by managerial firms with asymmetric costs

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