Competition and the strategic choice of managerial incentives: the relative performance case

DOI10.1111/J.1467-999X.2011.04124.XzbMATH Open1239.90057MaRDI QIDQ2890959FDOQ2890959

Authors: Alessandra Chirco, Marcella Scrimitore, Caterina Colombo 

Publication date: 12 June 2012

Published in: Metroeconomica (Search for Journal in Brave)

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• Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition
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• Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly
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• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Managerial Incentives and Polluting Inputs Under Imperfect Competition
• Managerial performance incentives and firm risk during economic expansions and recessions
• Contract competition between hierarchies, managerial compensation and imperfectly correlated shocks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cites Work

• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
• Identification of classes of differential games for which the open loop is a degenerate feedback Nash equilibrium

Cited In (13)

• Contract competition between hierarchies, managerial compensation and imperfectly correlated shocks
• Market competition and lower tier incentives
• Strategic delegation under quality competition
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Nonlinear dynamics in a Cournot duopoly with isoelastic demand
• Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly
• Dynamic Cournot oligopoly game based on general isoelastic demand
• Managerial Incentives and Polluting Inputs Under Imperfect Competition
• Extended games played by managerial firms with asymmetric costs
• Observable managerial incentives and spatial competition
• Profitable environmental corporate social responsibility under managers' relative profit performance competition
• Management turnover, strategic ambiguity and supply incentives
• Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition

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