Competition and the strategic choice of managerial incentives: the relative performance case
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2890959
Recommendations
- Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition
- Relative performance compensation, contests, and dynamic incentives
- Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly
- Observable managerial incentives and spatial competition
- Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
- Managerial Incentives and Polluting Inputs Under Imperfect Competition
- Managerial performance incentives and firm risk during economic expansions and recessions
- Contract competition between hierarchies, managerial compensation and imperfectly correlated shocks
Cites work
Cited in
(19)- Contract competition between hierarchies, managerial compensation and imperfectly correlated shocks
- Managerial delegation in monopoly and social welfare
- Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition
- Profitable environmental corporate social responsibility under managers' relative profit performance competition
- Executive compensation and competitive pressure in the product market: how does firm entry shape managerial incentives?
- Strategic delegation under quality competition
- Managerial Incentives and Polluting Inputs Under Imperfect Competition
- Dynamic Cournot oligopoly game based on general isoelastic demand
- Strategic delegation in consumer cooperatives under mixed oligopoly
- Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly
- Market competition and lower tier incentives
- Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers
- Nonlinear dynamics in a Cournot duopoly with isoelastic demand
- Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
- Observable managerial incentives and spatial competition
- Managerial accountability under yardstick competition
- Management centrality in sequential bargaining: implications for strategic delegation, welfare, and stakeholder conflict
- Management turnover, strategic ambiguity and supply incentives
- Extended games played by managerial firms with asymmetric costs
This page was built for publication: Competition and the strategic choice of managerial incentives: the relative performance case
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2890959)