Strategic delegation in consumer cooperatives under mixed oligopoly

DOI10.1007/S00712-013-0384-YzbMATH Open1402.91302OpenAlexW2020795920MaRDI QIDQ1651025FDOQ1651025

Michael Kopel, Marco A. Marini

Publication date: 16 July 2018

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.uniurb.it/RePEc/urb/wpaper/WP_13_06.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

price competitionoligopolyconsumer cooperativesstrategic incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation
• Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
• `Just one of us': Consumers playing oligopoly in mixed markets
• Corporate Governance

Cited In (6)

• Strategic corporate social responsibility, imperfect competition, and market concentration
• Strategic delegation in successive oligopolies with differentiated firms
• Delegation in oligopoly: managerial schemes and loan commitments
• Firms' strategic delegation with heterogeneous consumers
• Strategic delegation effects on Cournot and Stackelberg competition
• Global dynamics of an oligopoly game model with nonlinear costs and strategic delegation

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