Management centrality in sequential bargaining: implications for strategic delegation, welfare, and stakeholder conflict

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2022-0076OpenAlexW4386772443MaRDI QIDQ6131133FDOQ6131133

Authors: Domenico Buccella, Nicola Meccheri 

Publication date: 4 April 2024

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2022-0076

zbMATH Keywords

social welfarebargaining powerstrategic delegationunionsmanagement centralitystakeholder conflict

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Labor markets (91B39)

Cites Work

• Power in a Theory of the Firm
• Technology transfer with commitment.
• Unions and strategic managerial incentives
• Strategic delegation under cost asymmetry
• Managerial delegation of competing vertical chains with vertical externality
• Bridging behavioral and economic theories of decline: Organizational inertia, strategic competition, and chronic failure

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