Management centrality in sequential bargaining: implications for strategic delegation, welfare, and stakeholder conflict

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2022-0076MaRDI QIDQ6131133zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Domenico Buccella, Nicola Meccheri

Publication date 4 April 2024

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2022-0076

zbMATH Keywords

social welfarebargaining powerstrategic delegationunionsmanagement centralitystakeholder conflict

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Labor markets (91B39)

Recommendations

• Cross-ownership and managerial delegation under vertical product differentiation
• Competition and the strategic choice of managerial incentives: the relative performance case
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Cites work

• Bridging behavioral and economic theories of decline: Organizational inertia, strategic competition, and chronic failure
• Managerial delegation of competing vertical chains with vertical externality
• Power in a Theory of the Firm
• Strategic delegation under cost asymmetry
• Technology transfer with commitment.
• Unions and strategic managerial incentives

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