Managerial delegation of competing vertical chains with vertical externality
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Publication:2099062
DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2019-0029OpenAlexW3124196883MaRDI QIDQ2099062FDOQ2099062
Authors: Kangsik Choi, Ki-Dong Lee, Seonyoung Lim 
Publication date: 22 November 2022
Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0029
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Cites Work
Cited In (8)
- Managerial Delegation, Law Enforcement, and Aggregate Productivity
- An analysis of managerial delegation in a market with vertically-integrated producer owning an essential input monopolistically
- Strategic managerial delegation and cross-border mergers
- Strategic delegation in successive oligopolies with differentiated firms
- Delegation in oligopoly: managerial schemes and loan commitments
- Managerial delegation and welfare effects of cost reductions
- Management centrality in sequential bargaining: implications for strategic delegation, welfare, and stakeholder conflict
- The strategic adoption of environmental corporate social responsibility with network externalities
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