Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted
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Publication:1115327
DOI10.1016/0377-2217(89)90328-7zbMath0663.90007MaRDI QIDQ1115327
Kashi R. Balachandran, Joshua Ronen
Publication date: 1989
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(89)90328-7
subcontracting; moral hazard; adverse selection; decentralization; pricing; agency; transfer price; Optimal incentive compensation function
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