Incentives in a Divisionalized Firm

From MaRDI portal
Publication:4197613

DOI10.1287/mnsc.25.3.221zbMath0409.90048OpenAlexW1986653722MaRDI QIDQ4197613

Theodore Groves, Martin Loeb

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.25.3.221




Related Items (22)

Service capacity decision and incentive compatible cost allocation for reporting usage forecastsAn analysis of supply chain decisions with asymmetrical retailers : effects of disruptions and static service cost on coordination mechanismReporting behavior: a literature review of experimental studiesSetting the right incentives for global planning and operationsAllocation of resources in a divisionalized firmIncentive contracts when production is subcontractedDecentralization of responsibility for site decontamination projects: A budget allocation approachAn interactive heuristic for financial planning in decentralized organizationsResource Allocation for Homeland Defense: Dealing with the Team EffectFirms, queues, and coffee breaks: a flow model of corporate activity with delaysAn incentive model of duopoly with government coordinationA control-theoretic view on incentivesContinuous implementation in economies with incomplete informationCharacterization of desirable information processing and decision making systems in organizationMisrepresentation-proof strategies in poly-agent systemsSupply chain disruption management and evolutionarily stable strategies of retailers in the quantity-setting duopoly situation with homogeneous goodsA family of incentive-compatible and non-subsidizing optimal resource allocation problemsDemand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailerOn misrepresentation-proof strategies in incentive design problemsIncentive compatible, collaborative production scheduling with simple communication among distributed agentsMathematical modeling of China's state-owned enterprises' contract systemExistence and derivation of optimal affine incentive schemes for Stackelberg games with partial information: a geometric approach†




This page was built for publication: Incentives in a Divisionalized Firm