An incentive model of duopoly with government coordination
DOI10.1016/0005-1098(81)90069-8zbMATH Open0471.90023OpenAlexW2043247697MaRDI QIDQ1158076FDOQ1158076
Authors: S. H. Smith 
Publication date: 1981
Published in: Automatica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0005-1098(81)90069-8
duopolyStackelberg gameincentive mechanismvoluntary cooperationone leaderdecision-dependent information structuregovernment coordinationoptimal coordinationstatic market modeltwo Nash followers
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
Cites Work
- Closed-loop Stackelberg solution to a multistage linear-quadratic game
- A control-theoretic view on incentives
- Information structure, Stackelberg games, and incentive controllability
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- Incentives in Teams
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- A concept of cooperative equilibrium for dynamic games
- Closed-loop Stackelberg strategies with applications in the optimal control of multilevel systems
- Incentives in a Divisionalized Firm
- Nonclassical control problems and Stackelberg games
- Allocation of Resources in Large Teams
- Sufficient conditions for Stackelberg and Nash strategies with memory
Cited In (5)
- Optimal affine leader functions in reverse Stackelberg games. Existence conditions and characterization
- Single-leader-multiple-follower games with boundedly rational agents
- Optimal and near-optimal incentive strategies in the hierarchical control of Markov chains
- Mathematical modeling of China's state-owned enterprises' contract system
- Research on local government governance and enterprise social responsibility behaviors under the perspective of Cournot duopoly competition: analyzing taxi companies and online car-hailing service companies
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