An incentive model of duopoly with government coordination
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3599745 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3399008 (Why is no real title available?)
- A concept of cooperative equilibrium for dynamic games
- A control-theoretic view on incentives
- Allocation of Resources in Large Teams
- Closed-loop Stackelberg solution to a multistage linear-quadratic game
- Closed-loop Stackelberg strategies with applications in the optimal control of multilevel systems
- Incentives in Teams
- Incentives in a Divisionalized Firm
- Information structure, Stackelberg games, and incentive controllability
- Nonclassical control problems and Stackelberg games
- Sufficient conditions for Stackelberg and Nash strategies with memory
Cited in
(5)- Optimal affine leader functions in reverse Stackelberg games. Existence conditions and characterization
- Single-leader-multiple-follower games with boundedly rational agents
- Optimal and near-optimal incentive strategies in the hierarchical control of Markov chains
- Mathematical modeling of China's state-owned enterprises' contract system
- Research on local government governance and enterprise social responsibility behaviors under the perspective of Cournot duopoly competition: analyzing taxi companies and online car-hailing service companies
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