Single-leader-multiple-follower games with boundedly rational agents

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2009.02.010zbMath1170.91306OpenAlexW2038914767MaRDI QIDQ2270555

Siddhartha Bhattacharyya, Kurian Tharakunnel

Publication date: 28 July 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2009.02.010

zbMATH Keywords

reinforcement learningbounded rationalityleader-follower games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (1)

A Markovian mechanism of proportional resource allocation in the incentive model as a dynamic stochastic inverse Stackelberg game

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