A Markovian mechanism of proportional resource allocation in the incentive model as a dynamic stochastic inverse Stackelberg game
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Publication:1634389
DOI10.3390/math6080131zbMath1418.91118OpenAlexW2884568218MaRDI QIDQ1634389
Natalya Danilova, Grigory Belyavsky, Guennady A. Ougolnitsky
Publication date: 18 December 2018
Published in: Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/math6080131
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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A Markovian mechanism of proportional resource allocation in the incentive model as a dynamic stochastic inverse Stackelberg game ⋮ A game-theoretic loss allocation approach in power distribution systems with high penetration of distributed generations
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