Incentive Stackelberg Strategies for a Dynamic Game on Terrorism
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Publication:5428670
DOI10.1007/978-0-8176-4553-3_23zbMath1154.91349OpenAlexW1581718563MaRDI QIDQ5428670
Doris A. Behrens, Gernot Tragler, Jonathan P. Caulkins, Gustav Feichtinger
Publication date: 23 November 2007
Published in: Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/Incentive_Stackelberg_Strategies_for_a_Dynamic_Game_on_Terrorism/6471548
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