Terrorists' eradication versus perpetual terror war

DOI10.1007/s10957-013-0380-yzbMath1293.91162OpenAlexW1999287263MaRDI QIDQ2251563

Bertrand Crettez, Naïla Hayek

Publication date: 14 July 2014

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-013-0380-y

zbMATH Keywords

differential gamesNash equilibriumcounterterror measures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Dynamic games (91A25) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Optimal control of a terror queue ⋮ Intertemporal versus spatial externalities in counterterror policy games ⋮ Nash equilibria in nonzero-sum differential games with impulse control

Cites Work

• Tractable classes of nonzero-sum open-loop Nash differential games: Theory and examples
• A differential game related to terrorism: Nash and Stackelberg strategies
• Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game
• The ecology of terror defense
• Discrete time Pontryagin principles with infinite horizon
• Optimizing counter-terror operations: should one fight fire with ``fire or ``water?
• Whether to attack a terrorist's resource stock today or tomorrow
• Why Defeating Insurgencies Is Hard: The Effect of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations—A Best-Case Scenario
• Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T-Period Game
• Incentive Stackelberg Strategies for a Dynamic Game on Terrorism
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