Optimal control of a terror queue

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2015.07.010zbMath1347.90025OpenAlexW1420089420WikidataQ59558504 ScholiaQ59558504MaRDI QIDQ320666

Jonathan P. Caulkins, Stefan Wrzaczek, Edward H. Kaplan, Andrea Seidl, Gustav Feichtinger

Publication date: 7 October 2016

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.07.010

zbMATH Keywords

optimal controlqueuesintelligencecounterterrorismstaffing models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90) Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Fuzzy and other nonstochastic uncertainty mathematical programming (90C70) History, political science (91F10) Optimality conditions for problems involving ordinary differential equations (49K15)

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