Why Defeating Insurgencies Is Hard: The Effect of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations—A Best-Case Scenario
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Publication:3100368
DOI10.1287/opre.1090.0700zbMath1233.91231OpenAlexW2013253821MaRDI QIDQ3100368
Moshe Kress, Roberto Szechtman
Publication date: 24 November 2011
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0700
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