Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters—Defensive Strategy with Endogenous Attacker Effort
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Publication:3392129
DOI10.1287/opre.1070.0434zbMath1167.91331OpenAlexW2047736339MaRDI QIDQ3392129
Publication date: 13 August 2009
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0434
Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
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