Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters—Defensive Strategy with Endogenous Attacker Effort
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Publication:3392129
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Cited in
(67)- Resource allocation for homeland defense: dealing with the team effect
- A Tullock-contest-based approach for cyber security investments
- Two-stage invest-defend game: balancing strategic and operational decisions
- Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game
- Modeling credible retaliation threats in deterring the smuggling of nuclear weapons using partial inspection -- a three-stage game
- Modeling Public–Private Partnerships in Disaster Management via Centralized and Decentralized Models
- Natural disasters and their impact on cooperation against a common enemy
- Analysis of facility protection strategies against an uncertain number of attacks: the stochastic R-interdiction median problem with fortification
- On the learning patterns and adaptive behavior of terrorist organizations
- An analytical approach to the protection planning of a rail intermodal terminal network
- Systems under attack-survivability rather than reliability: concept, results, and applications
- Regulation games between government and competing companies: oil spills and other disasters
- Optimizing system resilience: a facility protection model with recovery time
- A two‐stage network interdiction‐monitoring game
- Designing response supply chain against bioattacks
- The strategic interaction between a company and the government surrounding disasters
- Active and passive defense against multiple attack facilities
- Combined series and parallel systems subject to individual versus overarching defense and attack
- Adversarial risk analysis under partial information
- Modeling a multitarget attacker-defender game with budget constraints
- Interplay of rumor propagation and clarification on social media during crisis events -- a game-theoretic approach
- A two-resource allocation algorithm with an application to large-scale zero-sum defensive games
- A Stackelberg game model for resource allocation in cargo container security
- Shield versus sword resource distribution in \(K\)-round duels
- Static and dynamic resource allocation models for recovery of interdependent systems: application to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill
- Revenge or continued attack and defense in defender-attacker conflicts
- Cybersecurity investments in the supply chain: coordination and a strategic attacker
- Validating game-theoretic models of terrorism: insights from machine learning
- Defending against multiple different attackers
- Individual versus overarching protection and attack of assets
- A leader-follower partially observed, multiobjective Markov game
- Role of intelligence inputs in defending against cyber warfare and cyberterrorism
- Hybrid defensive resource allocations in the face of partially strategic attackers in a sequential defender-attacker game
- A survey of network interdiction models and algorithms
- The role of customs in securing containerized global supply chains
- Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists
- Critical infrastructure protection using secrecy -- a discrete simultaneous game
- Governments' and terrorists' defense and attack in a \(T\)-period game
- Information security investment when hackers disseminate knowledge
- Target-hardening decisions based on uncertain multiattribute terrorist utility
- Modeling and mitigating the effects of supply chain disruption in a defender-attacker game
- Modeling costly learning and counter-learning in a defender-attacker game with private defender information
- A medical resource allocation model for serving emergency victims with deteriorating health conditions
- Historical evolution and benefit-cost explanation of periodical fluctuation in coal mine safety supervision: an evolutionary game analysis framework
- On the value of exposure and secrecy of defense system: first-mover advantage vs. robustness
- Bargaining model of labor disputes considering social mediation and bounded rationality
- Optimal control of a terror queue
- Multithreat multisite protection: a security case study
- Augmented probability simulation methods for sequential games
- Active vs. passive defense against a strategic attacker
- Balancing congestion and security in the presence of strategic applicants with private information
- Coordination of strategic responses to security threats: Laboratory evidence
- Terrorism deterrence in a two country framework: strategic interactions between R\&D, defense and pre-emption
- Protection issues for supply systems involving random attacks
- Military system of systems architecting with individual system contracts
- Infrastructure security games
- Multi-objective Stackelberg game model for water supply networks against interdictions with incomplete information
- Publicity vs. impact in nonprofit disclosures and donor preferences: a sequential game with one nonprofit organization and \(N\) donors
- A review of attacker-defender games: current state and paths forward
- Fighting terrorism: how to position rapid response teams?
- Allocating capacity in parallel queues to improve their resilience to deliberate attack
- Information security: Designing a stochastic-network for throughput and reliability
- Network inspection for detecting strategic attacks
- A decomposable resource allocation model with generalized overarching protections
- Computational efficiency in multivariate adversarial risk analysis models
- When hackers err: the impacts of false positives on information security games
- A dilemma in the communication of a UAV with its controller
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