A Tullock-contest-based approach for cyber security investments

DOI10.1007/S10479-022-04958-ZzbMath1506.91007OpenAlexW4295763194MaRDI QIDQ2678588

Sigal Oren, Ella Segev, David Iliaev

Publication date: 23 January 2023

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-022-04958-z

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryequilibrium analysissequential gamesecurity gamessimultaneous game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Information security investment for competitive firms with hacker behavior and security requirements
• Stochastic asymmetric Blotto games: some new results
• The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game
• A lottery Blotto game with heterogeneous items of asymmetric valuations
• Pure strategy Nash equilibrium in 2-contestant generalized lottery Colonel Blotto games
• A full characterization of best-response functions in the lottery Colonel Blotto game
• Discriminatory power and pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the lottery blotto game
• Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters—Defensive Strategy with Endogenous Attacker Effort
• Modeling a Multitarget Attacker–Defender Game with Budget Constraints
• ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DETERRENCE IN SEQUENTIAL COLONEL BLOTTO GAMES

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