On the impossibility of deterrence in sequential Colonel Blotto games

DOI10.1142/S0219198912500119MaRDI QIDQ4908593zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Kjell Hausken

Publication date 6 March 2013

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

rent seekingColonel Blotto gamefixed resources

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) 2-person games (91A05) Dynamic games (91A25) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites work

• Contests with limited resources
• Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources
• Sequential, nonzero-sum ``Blotto: allocating defensive resources prior to attack
• Systems defense games: Colonel blotto, command and control
• The Colonel Blotto game

Cited in

(3)

• A full characterization of best-response functions in the lottery Colonel Blotto game
• Sequential, nonzero-sum ``Blotto: allocating defensive resources prior to attack
• A Tullock-contest-based approach for cyber security investments

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