On the impossibility of deterrence in sequential Colonel Blotto games

DOI10.1142/S0219198912500119zbMATH Open1272.91013MaRDI QIDQ4908593FDOQ4908593

Authors: Kjell Hausken 

Publication date: 6 March 2013

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Sequential, nonzero-sum ``Blotto: allocating defensive resources prior to attack
• The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game
• An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games
• Waging simple wars: a complete characterization of two-battlefield Blotto equilibria
• Blotto Games with Costly Winnings

zbMATH Keywords

rent seekingColonel Blotto gamefixed resources

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) 2-person games (91A05) Dynamic games (91A25) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Sequential, nonzero-sum ``Blotto: allocating defensive resources prior to attack
• The Colonel Blotto game
• Systems defense games: Colonel blotto, command and control
• Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources
• Contests with limited resources

Cited In (3)

• A full characterization of best-response functions in the lottery Colonel Blotto game
• Sequential, nonzero-sum ``Blotto: allocating defensive resources prior to attack
• A Tullock-contest-based approach for cyber security investments

This page was built for publication: On the impossibility of deterrence in sequential Colonel Blotto games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4908593)