Modeling a Multitarget Attacker–Defender Game with Budget Constraints

DOI10.1287/deca.2017.0346zbMath1416.91045MaRDI QIDQ4692029

Peiqiu Guan, Stephen C. Hora, Meilin He, Jun Zhuang

Publication date: 24 October 2018

Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2017.0346

zbMATH Keywords

budget constraint; Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition; subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; sequential game; simultaneous game; terrorism and counter terrorism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

91A24: Positional games (pursuit and evasion, etc.)

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