A full characterization of best-response functions in the lottery Colonel Blotto game
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Publication:2315394
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.040zbMath1418.91023OpenAlexW2923409511MaRDI QIDQ2315394
David Rojo Arjona, Dan Kovenock
Publication date: 5 August 2019
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.chapman.edu/research/institutes-and-centers/economic-science-institute/_files/WorkingPapers/kovenock-rojoarjona-blotto-response-function-2019.pdf
2-person games (91A05) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Cites Work
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- Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources
- ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DETERRENCE IN SEQUENTIAL COLONEL BLOTTO GAMES
- Game-Theory Models in the Allocation of Advertising Expenditures
- The Theory of Play and Integral Equations with Skew Symmetric Kernels
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