The robustness of `enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend' alliances

DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0650-XMaRDI QIDQ2452233zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David Rietzke, Brian Roberson

Publication date 2 June 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0650-x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites work

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• The Truel
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Cited in

(9)

• The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints
• A contest model of balancing
• How alliances form and conflict ensues
• Stability of alliance networks
• Sequential formation of alliances in survival contests
• Analyzing strategic behavior in a dynamic model of bargaining and war
• The enemy of my enemy is my friend: new conditions for network games
• Brothers in arms -- an experiment on the alliance puzzle
• A full characterization of best-response functions in the lottery Colonel Blotto game

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