The robustness of `enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend' alliances

DOI10.1007/s00355-012-0650-xzbMath1288.91113OpenAlexW2081568775MaRDI QIDQ2452233

Brian Roberson, David Rietzke

Publication date: 2 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0650-x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Analyzing strategic behavior in a dynamic model of bargaining and war ⋮ A full characterization of best-response functions in the lottery Colonel Blotto game

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