Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00131-3zbMath1069.91038MaRDI QIDQ1416496

Robert W. Rosenthal, Balázs Szentes

Publication date: 14 December 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Exposure problemMixed strategySimultaneous auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (17)

Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto games ⋮ Targeted campaign competition, loyal voters, and supermajorities ⋮ Introduction to the special issue on contests ⋮ A ``fractal solution to the chopstick auction ⋮ TWO-OBJECT TWO-BIDDER SIMULTANEOUS AUCTIONS ⋮ An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction ⋮ Buridanic competition ⋮ Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: Chopsticks and tetrahedra. ⋮ The robustness of `enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend' alliances ⋮ Contests with limited resources ⋮ All-pay \(2\times 2\) Hex: a multibattle contest with complementarities ⋮ The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game ⋮ Equilibrium transformations and the revenue equivalence theorem ⋮ Multimarket lobbying with reserves ⋮ Buying supermajorities in the lab ⋮ Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints ⋮ A Blotto game with incomplete information

Cites Work

• Simultaneous auctions with synergies
• Simultaneous auctions with synergies and common values
• Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: Chopsticks and tetrahedra.
• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules

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