Modeling Credible Retaliation Threats in Deterring the Smuggling of Nuclear Weapons Using Partial Inspection—A Three-Stage Game
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Publication:4691965
DOI10.1287/deca.2013.0288zbMath1398.91067MaRDI QIDQ4691965
Publication date: 24 October 2018
Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2013.0288
game theory; deterrence; terrorism; smuggling; credible retaliation threats; noncredible retaliation threats
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