Balancing congestion and security in the presence of strategic applicants with private information
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Publication:421494
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2011.01.019zbMath1237.90065OpenAlexW1974728714MaRDI QIDQ421494
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.01.019
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