Deterring the Smuggling of Nuclear Weapons in Container Freight Through Detection and Retaliation
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Publication:4691928
DOI10.1287/deca.1110.0199zbMath1398.91028OpenAlexW2114769834WikidataQ107023067 ScholiaQ107023067MaRDI QIDQ4691928
Naraphorn Haphuriwat, Henry H. Willis, Vicki M. Bier
Publication date: 24 October 2018
Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/36337d73b4e982fd8cf6eca59d7341cfcd0d4975
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- Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks
- Inspection games in arms control
- Playing for time: a sequential inspection game
- Efficient distributions of arms‐control inspection effort
- A large‐scale linear programming model for finding optimal container inspection strategies
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