Two-Stage Invest–Defend Game: Balancing Strategic and Operational Decisions
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Publication:5121285
DOI10.1287/deca.2018.0377zbMath1441.90077OpenAlexW2920950522WikidataQ128246029 ScholiaQ128246029MaRDI QIDQ5121285
Melike Baykal-Gürsoy, Abdolmajid Yolmeh
Publication date: 14 September 2020
Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2018.0377
budget constraintsequential gametwo-stage gamesimultaneous gamestrategic decision makinginfrastructure security gamesterrorism and counterterrorism
Applications of game theory (91A80) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50)
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Uses Software
Cites Work
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