Information Security Investment When Hackers Disseminate Knowledge
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Publication:4691973
DOI10.1287/deca.2013.0278zbMath1398.91387OpenAlexW2111962383MaRDI QIDQ4691973
Xing Gao, Weijun Zhong, Shue Mei
Publication date: 24 October 2018
Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2013.0278
Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Economics of information (91B44) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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Competitive information security investment under hacker knowledge dissemination ⋮ Open Source or Closed Source? A Competitive Analysis with Software Security ⋮ Timely Decision Analysis Enabled by Efficient Social Media Modeling ⋮ Managing Security Outsourcing in the Presence of Strategic Hackers ⋮ Stochastic Superiority Equilibrium in Game Theory ⋮ Information security investment for competitive firms with hacker behavior and security requirements
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