Whether to attack a terrorist's resource stock today or tomorrow

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.001zbMath1152.91687OpenAlexW2013232145MaRDI QIDQ2519485

Kjell Hausken

Publication date: 26 January 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/184319

zbMATH Keywords

growthdynamicsdiscountingconflictcontest success functionterrorismterror capacitythreattwo periodstime substitutionattack inefficiencydefense inefficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

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Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The ecology of terror defense
• Contest success functions
• The battle of the sexes when the future is important
• Optimal Pilfering Policies for Dynamic Continuous Thieves
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Optimal Inventory Policy
• Social conflict and growth.