Governments Playing Games and Combating the Dynamics of a Terrorist Organization
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Publication:5013393
DOI10.1142/S0219198920500139zbMath1479.91011OpenAlexW3080448068MaRDI QIDQ5013393
Publication date: 30 November 2021
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198920500139
game theorysimulationdynamicsdifferential equationsevolutionfree ridinginterventionterrorismcaptive participantsgovernmentsideologuesmercenariessponsorsterrorist organizations
Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18) Qualitative investigation and simulation of ordinary differential equation models (34C60)
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