Endogenizing the sticks and carrots: modeling possible perverse effects of counterterrorism measures

DOI10.1007/S10479-010-0833-8MaRDI QIDQ646633zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vicki M. Bier, Kjell Hausken

Publication date 17 November 2011

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-010-0833-8

zbMATH Keywords

dynamicsconflictdiscountingcontest success functionterrorismterror capacitythreat

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Mathematical economics (91B99)

Recommendations

• Incentive Stackelberg Strategies for a Dynamic Game on Terrorism
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Cites work

• Contest success functions
• Remarks on the Intrinsic Equations of Twisted Curves
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• The ecology of terror defense

Cited in

(12)

• A review of attacker-defender games: current state and paths forward
• Governmental combat of the dynamics of multiple competing terrorist organizations
• Carrots, sticks and fog during insurgencies
• Governments playing games and combating the dynamics of a terrorist organization
• Why direct counter‐terrorism measures only may fail: An analysis of direct and preventive counter‐terrorism measures
• National security vs. human rights: a game theoretic analysis of the tension between these objectives
• The ``six-element analysis method for the research on the characteristics of terrorist activities
• On the learning patterns and adaptive behavior of terrorist organizations
• The path of terror attacks
• Principal-agent theory, game theory, and the precautionary principle
• The refugee game: the relationship between individual security expenditures and collective security
• Terrorism deterrence in a two country framework: strategic interactions between R\&D, defense and pre-emption

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