Endogenizing the sticks and carrots: modeling possible perverse effects of counterterrorism measures

DOI10.1007/S10479-010-0833-8zbMATH Open1237.91182OpenAlexW1973977385MaRDI QIDQ646633FDOQ646633

Authors: Vicki M. Bier, Kjell Hausken 

Publication date: 17 November 2011

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-010-0833-8

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zbMATH Keywords

dynamicsconflictdiscountingcontest success functionterrorismterror capacitythreat

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Mathematical economics (91B99)

Cites Work

• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Contest success functions
• The ecology of terror defense
• Remarks on the Intrinsic Equations of Twisted Curves

Cited In (12)

• A review of attacker-defender games: current state and paths forward
• Governmental combat of the dynamics of multiple competing terrorist organizations
• Carrots, sticks and fog during insurgencies
• Governments playing games and combating the dynamics of a terrorist organization
• Why direct counter‐terrorism measures only may fail: An analysis of direct and preventive counter‐terrorism measures
• National security vs. human rights: a game theoretic analysis of the tension between these objectives
• The ``six-element analysis method for the research on the characteristics of terrorist activities
• Principal-agent theory, game theory, and the precautionary principle
• On the learning patterns and adaptive behavior of terrorist organizations
• The path of terror attacks
• The refugee game: the relationship between individual security expenditures and collective security
• Terrorism deterrence in a two country framework: strategic interactions between R\&D, defense and pre-emption

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