Strategic deterrence of terrorist attacks
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Publication:2807022
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-28697-6_86zbMATH Open1341.91026OpenAlexW2465965436MaRDI QIDQ2807022FDOQ2807022
Authors: Marcus Wiens, Sascha Meng, Frank Schultmann 
Publication date: 19 May 2016
Published in: Operations Research Proceedings (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28697-6_86
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