Strategic deterrence of terrorist attacks

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-28697-6_86MaRDI QIDQ2807022zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marcus Wiens, Sascha Meng, Frank Schultmann

Publication date 19 May 2016

Published in Operations Research Proceedings (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28697-6_86

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

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(13)

• Game-theoretic and reliability methods in counter-terrorism and security
• The ecology of terror defense
• Endogenizing the sticks and carrots: modeling possible perverse effects of counterterrorism measures
• The hybridisation of conflict: a prospect theoretic analysis
• When the winning move is not to play: games of deterrence in cyber security
• On the learning patterns and adaptive behavior of terrorist organizations
• Security economics: an adversarial risk analysis approach to airport protection
• Terrorists' eradication versus perpetual terror war
• On the Allocation of Effort Among Deterrent Systems
• Nature plays with dice - terrorists do not: Allocating resources to counter strategic versus probabilistic risks
• An analysis of short-term responses to threats of terrorism
• Counterthreat of attack to deter aggression
• Terrorism deterrence in a two country framework: strategic interactions between R\&D, defense and pre-emption

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