Strategic deterrence of terrorist attacks
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Publication:2807022
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- The ecology of terror defense
- Endogenizing the sticks and carrots: modeling possible perverse effects of counterterrorism measures
- The hybridisation of conflict: a prospect theoretic analysis
- When the winning move is not to play: games of deterrence in cyber security
- On the learning patterns and adaptive behavior of terrorist organizations
- Security economics: an adversarial risk analysis approach to airport protection
- Terrorists' eradication versus perpetual terror war
- On the Allocation of Effort Among Deterrent Systems
- Nature plays with dice - terrorists do not: Allocating resources to counter strategic versus probabilistic risks
- An analysis of short-term responses to threats of terrorism
- Counterthreat of attack to deter aggression
- Terrorism deterrence in a two country framework: strategic interactions between R\&D, defense and pre-emption
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