The ecology of terror defense
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Publication:1404268
DOI10.1023/A:1024167124083zbMath1047.91574MaRDI QIDQ1404268
Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard J. Zeckhauser
Publication date: 21 August 2003
Published in: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (16)
GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF TWO-PERIOD-DEPENDENT DEGRADED MULTISTATE RELIABILITY SYSTEMS ⋮ Optimal control of a terror queue ⋮ A game theoretic model for resource allocation among countermeasures with multiple attributes ⋮ Endogenizing the sticks and carrots: modeling possible perverse effects of counterterrorism measures ⋮ Optimizing counter-terror operations: should one fight fire with ``fire or ``water? ⋮ Terrorists' eradication versus perpetual terror war ⋮ A differential game related to terrorism: Nash and Stackelberg strategies ⋮ Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists ⋮ Optimal control of counter-terrorism tactics ⋮ Defending against multiple different attackers ⋮ Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T-Period Game ⋮ Modeling Public–Private Partnerships in Disaster Management via Centralized and Decentralized Models ⋮ Whether to attack a terrorist's resource stock today or tomorrow ⋮ Terror and counterterror operations: Differential game with cyclical Nash solution ⋮ The path of terror attacks ⋮ Optimal control of terrorism and global reputation: a case study with novel threshold behavior
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