Modeling Public–Private Partnerships in Disaster Management via Centralized and Decentralized Models
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4692007
DOI10.1287/deca.2015.0319zbMath1398.91366MaRDI QIDQ4692007
Publication date: 24 October 2018
Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2015.0319
investment; subsidy; sequential games; centralized model; decentralized model; public and private partnerships (PPPs)
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
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