A modelization of public-private partnerships with failure time
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Publication:5261209
Recommendations
- Optimal contract with moral hazard for public private partnerships
- Optimal stopping contract for public private partnerships under moral hazard
- Comparison of models of planning public-private partnership
- Agency problems in public-private partnerships investment projects
- Cost allocation in PPP projects: an analysis based on the theory of ``contracts as reference points
Cited in
(11)- Risk sharing in public-private partnerships
- Modeling Public–Private Partnerships in Disaster Management via Centralized and Decentralized Models
- A sequential procurement model for a PPP project pipeline
- Cost allocation in PPP projects: an analysis based on the theory of ``contracts as reference points
- Agency problems in public-private partnerships investment projects
- Optimal stopping contract for public private partnerships under moral hazard
- Comparison of models of planning public-private partnership
- Sustainable and optimal ``uniqueness contract in public-private partnership projects of transportation infrastructure
- Reducing the debt: is it optimal to outsource an investment?
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1945735 (Why is no real title available?)
- Optimal contract with moral hazard for public private partnerships
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