A sequential procurement model for a PPP project pipeline
From MaRDI portal
Publication:280172
DOI10.1007/s00291-015-0421-zzbMath1339.90168MaRDI QIDQ280172
Dennis De Clerck, Erik L. Demeulemeester
Publication date: 4 May 2016
Published in: OR Spectrum (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/123456789/510484
Markov perfect equilibrium; best response heuristic; public-private partnerships; sequential procurement auction
90B50: Management decision making, including multiple objectives
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Related Items
Cites Work
- Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers
- Optimal auctions with information acquisition
- Declining prices in sequential auctions with complete revelation of bids
- Commitment in sequential auctioning: Advance listings and threshold prices
- A two stage sequential auction with multi-unit demands
- Sequential auctions of stochastically equivalent objects
- Sequential auctions with synergies: An example
- An electromagnetism-like mechanism for global optimization
- Potential games
- On bidding for a fixed number of items in a sequence of auctions
- Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers
- Sequential auctions for stochastically equivalent complementary objects
- First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model
- Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information
- The Importance of Ordering in Sequential Auctions
- Research Note—Strategic Bid-Shading and Sequential Auctioning with Learning from Past Prices
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Optimal Bidding in Sequential Auctions
- Cost Uncertainty in Competitive Bidding Models
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Stochastic Games
- Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
