Optimal auctions with information acquisition
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Publication:765226
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.015zbMATH Open1279.91091OpenAlexW3125504160MaRDI QIDQ765226FDOQ765226
Authors: Xianwen Shi 
Publication date: 19 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/tecipa-302.pdf
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Cites Work
- Stochastic orders
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- Contracts and productive information gathering
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- Optimal search auctions
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- Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
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- The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
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Cited In (48)
- Signaling covertly acquired information
- Try before you buy: a theory of dynamic information acquisition
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning
- MONOPOLY INSURANCE AND ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION
- Information design in optimal auctions
- Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
- A sequential procurement model for a PPP project pipeline
- Information elicitation for Bayesian auctions
- Hybrid auctions revisited
- Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract
- Auctions with dynamic costly information acquisition
- Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions
- Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert
- Contracts with endogenous information
- Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs
- Optimal contest design: tuning the heat
- Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition
- Pessimistic information gathering
- Competitive contracts with productive information gathering
- On information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellers
- Auctions with costly information acquisition
- Information acquisition during a descending auction
- Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed
- Information, stochastic dominance and bidding: the case of treasury auctions
- Auctions with flexible information acquisition
- Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions with costly information
- A nearly optimal auction for an uninformed seller
- On Revenue Maximization for Agents with Costly Information Acquisition
- Optimal auctions with simultaneous and costly participation
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release
- Optimal advertising of auctions
- Optimal auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders
- Auction and the informed seller problem
- Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions
- Optimal search auctions
- Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
- Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach
- Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types
- Does more information-gathering effort raise or lower the average quantity produced?
- Endogenous information and stochastic contracts
- The role of optimal threats in auction design
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
- Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions
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