Optimal auctions with information acquisition

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Publication:765226

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.015zbMath1279.91091OpenAlexW3125504160MaRDI QIDQ765226

Xianwen Shi

Publication date: 19 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/tecipa-302.pdf




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