Competitive contracts with productive information gathering

DOI10.1007/S00712-017-0587-8MaRDI QIDQ1616610zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bing Ye, Sanxi Li

Publication date 7 November 2018

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0587-8

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcontractsinformation gathering

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract
• Contracts with endogenous information
• Competition for Procurement Contracts and Underinvestment
• Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning

Cites work

• Auctioning Supply Contracts
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Contracts with endogenous information
• Cost-Reducing Investment, Optimal Procurement and Implementation by Auctions
• Information Acquisition in Auctions
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Optimal auctions with information acquisition
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Regulation of a risk averse firm
• The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After
• The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations

Cited in

(2)

• On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries
• Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract

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