Regulation of a risk averse firm

DOI10.1006/GAME.1998.0639MaRDI QIDQ1272618zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean-Charles Rochet

Publication date 3 January 1999

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0639

zbMATH Keywords

bunchingcost-plus contractsLaffont-Tirole regulation modeloptimal contractrisk-averse firms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Risk aversion in regulatory capital principles
• Regulating a firm under adverse selection and moral hazard in uncertain environment
• Regulation risk
• Risk, uncertainty and regulation
• Regulatory arbitrage of risk measures
• Equilibrium impact of value-at-risk regulation
• The impact of regulation on risk and return
• On risk averse competitive equilibrium
• Allocating systemic risk in a regulatory perspective

Cites work

• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
• Monopoly and product quality
• Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Models
• On Moral Hazard and Insurance
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
• Value of communication in agencies

Cited in

(15)

• Competitive contracts with productive information gathering
• Regulating a firm under adverse selection and moral hazard in uncertain environment
• Simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents
• Impact of price cap regulation on supply chain contracting between two monopolists
• Impact of risk aversion and countervailing tax in oligopoly
• Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information
• The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After
• Regulation games between government and competing companies: oil spills and other disasters
• Regulatory arbitrage of risk measures
• Social norms, regulation, and environmental risk
• Auctioning long-term projects under financial constraints
• Common agency with risk-averse agent
• Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
• Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach
• Equilibrium impact of value-at-risk regulation

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