Regulating a firm under adverse selection and moral hazard in uncertain environment
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1724086
DOI10.1155/2014/419207zbMath1406.91145OpenAlexW2095013962WikidataQ59037798 ScholiaQ59037798MaRDI QIDQ1724086
Jing Feng, Ruiqing Zhao, Yanfei Lan
Publication date: 14 February 2019
Published in: Abstract and Applied Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/419207
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- A bilevel fuzzy principal-agent model for optimal nonlinear taxation problems
- Existence and uniqueness theorem for uncertain differential equations
- Risk model with fuzzy random individual claim amount
- Regulation of a risk averse firm
- An uncertain price discrimination model in labor market
- Modeling fuzzy multi-period production planning and sourcing problem with credibility service levels
- An uncertain contract model for rural migrant worker's employment problems
- A yardstick competition approach to a multi-firm regulation problem under asymmetric information
- UNCERTAIN OPTIMAL CONTROL WITH APPLICATION TO A PORTFOLIO SELECTION MODEL
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Nonparametric Identification of a Contract Model With Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
- A fuzzy supply chain contract problem with pricing and warranty
- Uncertainty theory
This page was built for publication: Regulating a firm under adverse selection and moral hazard in uncertain environment
