Nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard
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Recommendations
- Nonparametric adverse selection problems
- Identification of participation constraints in contracts
- Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?
- Dynamic contracts with moral hazard and adverse selection
- Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection
Cited in
(12)- Identification of participation constraints in contracts
- Regulating a firm under adverse selection and moral hazard in uncertain environment
- The empirical content of Cournot competition
- On the identification of the procurement model
- Estimating price sensitivity of economic agents using discontinuity in nonlinear contracts
- Identifying and testing models of managerial compensation
- Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
- Risk-aversion and B2B contracting under asymmetric information: evidence from managed print services
- A structural analysis of simple contracts
- Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts
- Quantile analysis of ``hazard-rate game models
- Identification and estimation of dynamic structural models with unobserved choices
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