Identifying and testing models of managerial compensation

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDV004MaRDI QIDQ4610736zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors George-Levi Gayle, Robert A. Miller

Publication date 23 January 2019

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/Identifying_and_Testing_Models_of_Managerial_Compensation/6705902

zbMATH Keywords

empirical contenthidden informationmanagerial compensationmoral hazardpartial identificationsemiparametric

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Executive compensation and earnings management under moral hazard
• Endogenous selection and moral hazard in compensation contracts
• Executive compensation: a calibration approach
• Optimal incentive contracting with ex ante and ex post moral hazards: Theory and evidence
• Nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard

Cited in

(3)

• Executive compensation and earnings management under moral hazard
• Identification and estimation of dynamic structural models with unobserved choices
• Econometrics of insurance with multidimensional types

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