Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 52448 (Why is no real title available?)
- Adverse selection under ignorance
- Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
- Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
- Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- Nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard
- On the robustness of Laissez-Faire
Cited in
(19)- Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity
- Robust incentives for risk
- Recursive non-expected utility: connecting ambiguity attitudes to risk preferences and the level of ambiguity
- Simple probability models for project contracting
- Robust Incentives for Teams
- Locally robust contracts for moral hazard
- A note on robust procurement contracts
- Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion
- Robust contracting with additive noise
- Robust performance evaluation of independent agents
- Robust contract designs: linear contracts and moral hazard
- Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- Salesforce contracting under model uncertainty
- Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
- Ambiguity in dynamic contracts
- Robust mechanisms: the curvature case
- A general framework for robust contracting models
- Robust incentives for information acquisition
- Robust contracting in general contract spaces
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