Salesforce contracting under model uncertainty
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Publication:2060584
DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2021.05.008OpenAlexW3161283700MaRDI QIDQ2060584
Jianru Zhang, Yi Li, Ju'e Guo, Kin Keung Lai
Publication date: 13 December 2021
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2021.05.008
Operations research, mathematical programming (90-XX) Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)
Cites Work
- Robust contracting with additive noise
- Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
- Salesforce contract design and inventory planning with asymmetric risk-averse sales agents
- The first-order approach to the principal-agent problems under inequality aversion
- Technical Note—Impact of Inventory on Quota-Bonus Contracts with Rent Sharing
- Axiomatic Foundations of Multiplier Preferences
- The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- Quota-Based Compensation Plans for Multiterritory Heterogeneous Salesforces
- Robust Contract Designs: Linear Contracts and Moral Hazard
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