Salesforce contract design and inventory planning with asymmetric risk-averse sales agents

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2012.11.010zbMath1266.90007MaRDI QIDQ2376742

Yue Dai, Xiuli Chao

Publication date: 24 June 2013

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2012.11.010

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric information; mechanism design; inventory planning; salesforce incentive

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

90B05: Inventory, storage, reservoirs

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