Salesforce contract design and inventory planning with asymmetric risk-averse sales agents

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2012.11.010MaRDI QIDQ2376742zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yue Dai, Xiuli Chao

Publication date 24 June 2013

Published in Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2012.11.010

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationinventory planningmechanism designsalesforce incentive

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05)

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(16)

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• Information Disclosure Model Under Supply Chain Competition with Asymmetric Demand Disruption
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