The first-order approach to the principal-agent problems under inequality aversion

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2013.06.012MaRDI QIDQ2450705zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Susumu Cato

Publication date 15 May 2014

Published in Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2013.06.012

zbMATH Keywords

first-order approachmoral hazardinequality aversionbehavioral contract theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

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Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
• Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests

Cited in

(7)

• Distributions for the first-order approach to principal-agent problems
• Optimal incentive contracts under loss aversion and inequity aversion
• Other-regarding preferences in organizational hierarchies
• Equity-based incentive to coordinate shareholder-manager interests under information asymmetry
• On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending
• Salesforce contracting under model uncertainty
• Venture capital contracting with double-sided moral hazard and fairness concerns

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