Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.007zbMath1230.91096OpenAlexW3121411784MaRDI QIDQ980958

Florian Englmaier, Achim Wambach

Publication date: 8 July 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-127126

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractscontract theoryincentivesinequity aversionlinear contractssufficient statistics result

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites Work

• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• A theory of sequential reciprocity
• A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness
• A theory of reciprocity
• Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• Promises and Partnership

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