Salesforce contract design, joint pricing and production planning with asymmetric overconfidence sales agent
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Publication:2628190
DOI10.3934/jimo.2016051zbMath1364.90016OpenAlexW2512116912MaRDI QIDQ2628190
Min Huang, Wai-Ki Ching, Kegui Chen, Xin Yu Wang
Publication date: 12 June 2017
Published in: Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2016051
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