Overconfidence and market efficiency with heterogeneous agents
From MaRDI portal
Publication:868599
DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0048-4zbMath1109.91351MaRDI QIDQ868599
Francesco Sangiorgi, Diego García, Branko Urosevic
Publication date: 6 March 2007
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/822
Rational expectations; Information acquisition; Partially revealing equilibria; Price informativeness
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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Optimism and firm formation, Bounded rationality, asymmetric information and mispricing in financial markets, Voluntary information disclosure with heterogeneous beliefs, Salesforce contract design, joint pricing and production planning with asymmetric overconfidence sales agent
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